India and China are yet again engaging in an ‘early harvest’ approach to their longstanding territorial disputes, resolving the less complicated stretches of the LAC first while keeping the more contentious stretches for the future. External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar emphasised that maintenance of tranquillity at the border remains instrumental to stabilising relations.
Following the Galwan clashes of 2020 and an intense breakdown of political goodwill, any direction away from confrontation merits attention. However, India must ask sternly: is this an early harvest for Indian security or merely a political harvest for Beijing?
The latest face-offs in Arunachal Pradesh render the question more pertinent. ITBP Director General Shatrujeet Kapur confirmed that the Indian and Chinese troops continue to be at loggerheads in multiple locations, even though both countries are attempting to extend broader diplomatic stabilisation.
Jaishankar noted that tensions along the LAC have eased since 2024, with both sides agreeing to hold talks for complete disengagement. But normalising the atmosphere does not settle the dispute. Differences over alignment, patrolling, infrastructure, buffer zones and military presence have not disappeared; they are simply being managed more carefully.
The situation in Arunachal clearly indicates this. A standoff has been reported close to Asaphila in the Taksing area of Upper Subansiri district, while Longju has also been classified as sensitive. These skirmishes are reportedly being dealt with through flag meetings and hotlines, but the continued debacle proves that calm between leaders seldom means calm on the ground.
India should accept progress only when it is visible on the ground: restored patrolling, clearly defined buffer zones and mechanisms that make repeated probing costly for either side. Arunachal should act as a test case. If China’s willing to engage in stabilisation talks while maintaining a hardline in the eastern sector, disengagement must not be mistaken for de-escalation along the LAC.
As ties improve, India will face pressure to restore Chinese investment, ease visa restrictions and deepen supply-chain dependence before the border question is settled. India-China trade stood at $151.1 billion in FY26, with imports from China at $131.63 billion and Indian exports at $19.47 billion, leaving a deficit of $112.16 billion.
This dependence on Chinese electronics, solar equipment, pharmaceuticals and automobile components gives Beijing leverage. This leverage intensifies as border coercion persists alongside commercial access.
Cartographic discrepancies add further to the complications. China has frequently renamed places in Arunachal while India has rejected these attempts as fictitious. New Delhi has since officially marked 27 places and features in the state on official maps. These may appear symbolic, but they bolster Chinese claims and enfeeble the factual basis of India’s sovereignty.
Coming to what India must demand for normal ties, firstly, security deliverables should precede economic concessions. Investment relaxations in strategic sectors should follow demonstrated stability and complete disengagement, including in sensitive Arunachal sectors.
Second, every agreement must be verifiable. It should specify maps, timelines, patrol schedules, communication protocols, buffer-zone rules and penalties for violations.
Third, economic normalisation must be reciprocal. Chinese investment should be welcomed only where it builds Indian capacity and employment without compromising security. India must also expand domestic manufacturing to strengthen its bargaining position.
Finally, strategic autonomy cannot be traded away. A stable LAC must not require India to dilute ties with the US, Europe or Japan.
The early harvest will succeed only if it reduces China’s capacity for coercion, improves transparency along the LAC and strengthens India’s economic resilience. If it merely restores business as usual while the trade deficit grows and face-offs continue, it becomes a harvest for Beijing.
Arunachal has made the test more agonising. If confrontations continue, positions remain contended, and cartographic discrepancies persist, an ‘early harvest’ restricted to quieter sectors will leave India’s most vulnerable eastern frontier exposed and unresolved.
India needs a stable, predictable relationship with China, not hostility. But pragmatism must have a limit: no economic or political normalisation should overpower verifiable peace in Arunachal. Until Beijing stops poking, renaming and pressuring the eastern sector, every Indian concession should remain conditional.
The writer is a researcher whose work focuses on international relations, security and policy.