By Jerzy Wójcik
Contrary to the optimistic vision of stabilisation and economic development in the Middle East contained in the Trump administration’s US strategic documents, Israeli political elites appear to perceive the coming years as a period of systemic uncertainty.
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From their perspective, Israel is at a historic turning point that justifies pursuing policies that maximise strategic goals, even at high international cost. The goal is to gain acceptance for the vision of a single state in the Palestinian territory. Regardless of whether the Palestinians will have a broader or more limited scope of presence and self-governance in West Bank, it should be assumed that by 2028 the strategy of the government of Benjamin Netanyahu will be focused on three aims.
One, the annexation process of parts of West Bank, while maintaining limited Palestinian representation in selected areas, could be seen as a strategic goal. Two, the voluntary or forced relocation of a portion of the Palestinian population from the West Bank.
Three, pursuing an offensive-defensive policy towards the Gaza Strip, the nature and intensity of which will depend on the evolving security situation in the area. The pursuit of a lasting resolution of the status of the territories of historic Palestine should be viewed as a central element of Israel’s strategic calculation. The Gaza Strip occupies a more ambivalent position within this strategy.
On one hand, its permanent integration into Israeli security systems cannot be ruled out, but on the other, under favourable conditions, it could become part of a broader regional and international agreement. Many indications suggest that Israeli strategic planning is currently being conducted within the timeframe set by Trump’s second term.
This period can be viewed in Jerusalem as a window of opportunity, enabling fundamental territorial and structural changes with relatively limited political costs in relations with US. At the same time, a gradual erosion of Israel’s relations with some European countries is visible. Although it maintains relatively stable relations with selected Central European countries, as well as with Germany and Austria, in the long term, the political directions of Israel and the European Union may increasingly diverge.
A key element of Israel’s strategy is relations with India, maintaining channels of communication with Russia, especially in context of Syria and Moscow’s relations with Tehran, and deepening cooperation with Persian Gulf states are gaining importance.
From Israel’s perspective, the most desirable scenario would be the creation of a regional security system focused on containing Iran, functioning independently of a resolution to the Palestinian issue. The second dimension of this strategy remains the continuation and expansion of the Abrahamic Agreements, albeit within a modified political logic.
Until now, the normalisation process has been characterised by relations between formally equal partners. In the current geopolitical situation, this dynamic may change. Arab states may find themselves under increasing psychological pressure stemming from the belief that remaining outside the system of regional agreements with Israel will have tangible consequences for their security. From a different perspective, regional states may seek to deepen strategic relations, including in military and defence dimensions, with powers such as China and India. For Israel, the expansion of the Abrahamic Accords remains a key strategic objective in the process of building a new security architecture.
For Saudi Arabia, the Palestinian issue remains an obstacle to normalising relations. This very area may become the subject of intensified diplomatic activity. From the Israeli perspective, the new securi ty structure is based on two parallel processes: changing the status of West Bank and normalising relations with Riyadh.
With its growing military superiority, Israel may seek to exert political pressure on the Saudi leadership to marginalise the Palestinian issue or partially exclude it from the normalisation process. The reduction of American security guarantees in the Middle East, combined with the growth of Israel’s regional military advantage, may induce Saudi Arabia to fundamentally redefine its policy towards the Palestinian issue and to revise its current support for the two-state concept.
Solution, and Israel itself may take additional military and diplomatic initiatives to accelerate the process.
Centre for International Relations, Poland
