By Shivaji Sarkar
The global energy crisis is spreading beyond petroleum, with the deepening Gulf and Red Sea disruptions threatening fuel supplies and shipping. India’s nuclear ambitions face a parallel challenge: securing adequate uranium at affordable cost as the country targets 100 GW of nuclear capacity by 2047.
Scarcity could raise procurement costs, delay reactor expansion and increase the cost of electricity. The world may face a painful economic transition marked by severe inflation as fuel prices and shipping costs surge, a temporary return to coal and domestic natural gas to bridge energy shortages, and strict fuel rationing that prioritises agriculture, emergency services and critical supply chains, all at the cost of slower economic growth.
The new Sustainable Harnessing and Advancement of Nuclear Energy for Transforming India Act, 2025 (SHANTI Act) opens civil nuclear power to eligible private companies and joint ventures while retaining government control over sensitive activities, including nuclear fuel enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing.
It introduces capacity-based operator liability caps, ranging from 100 crore for micro-reactors to Rs 3,000 crore for large plants, and provides for government-backed compensation beyond the op erator’s cap. Critics argue that limiting supplier liability weakens the polluter-pays principle and risks leaving the public to bear a substantial share of the cost of a major accident.
The high-level nuclear waste and spent fuel management for 5000 years remains a government expense without, so far, a dedicated funds liability from private operators. The problem extends beyond accident compensation.
High-level radioactive waste and spent-fuel management remain under government control. Although operators are expected to provide financial security for waste management and decommissioning, the absence of a dedicated, ring-fenced fund could leave taxpayers exposed to future disposal costs. India’s uranium dependence adds another layer of risk.
Domestic reserves are limited, and the country relies heavily on imports from suppliers including Kazakhstan, Canada, Uzbekistan, Australia, Russia and France. Global uranium demand is projected to rise substantially by 2050, while developing new mines can take 15–20 years. Long-term supply contracts and strategic reserves can provide some protection, but they cannot eliminate price volatility or logistical disruption.
India’s thorium reserves— estimated at about a quarter of the global total—offer a possible long-term alternative, but not an immediate solution. Thorium is not fissile and must first be converted into uranium-233 inside a reactor.
The process involves complex technology, expensive fuel reprocessing and difficult radiation-control requirements. The Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor at Kalpakkam reaching first criticality in April 2026 marks progress in India’s second-stage nuclear programme, but commercial thorium power remains a longer-term objective. Small modular reactors (SMRs) are another part of the expansion strategy.
India’s National Energy Mission, backed by Rs 20,000 crore, targets at least five indigenous SMRs by 2033, including the 220-MWe Bharat Small Modular Reactor. Yet smaller reactors are not automatically cheaper, and commercial viability will depend on construction costs, regulatory clarity, fuel availability and credible arrangements for waste management and decommissioning.
Fast breeder reactors and thorium could reduce uranium dependence over time but cannot resolve immediate shortages. India must therefore balance nuclear expansion with fuel security, technological readiness, rising costs and long-term public liabilities.
India cannot afford to abandon nuclear power, but it cannot pursue expansion by shifting its long-term costs and risks to the public. Uranium security, domestic technology and a stronger Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited must advance alongside transparent liability rules and properly funded waste disposal.
Nuclear power may strengthen energy security, but private investment must not become a mechanism for privatising profi ts while leaving taxpayers to carry the residual risks.