By Malay Mishra
Ever since India announced the standardisation of 28 places in Ladakh in accordance with the Survey of India’s demarcation, China’s behaviour towards India has changed markedly. The Centre’s revocation of Article 370 and declaration of Ladakh as a Union Territory on August 5, 2019, had drawn sharp criticism from Beijing. A Chinese spokesperson has since reportedly claimed all of eastern Ladakh, unsettling Delhi amid a thaw in bilateral ties. India seeks a larger role globally, even as dependence on Chinese intermediates contributes to a trade deficit of $112 billion.
During Xi’s recent visit to Delhi for the BRICS Summit (September 12-13), and earlier at the BRICS summit in Kazan in 2024 and the SCO summit in Tianjin in 2025, he and Modi appeared to develop a rapport that could have advanced understanding on the boundary dispute. China’s renewed reference to the November 1959 claim line, set out in Zhou Enlai’s letter to Nehru and rejected before the 1962 war, is a retrograde step. Delhi appears caught between two powers.
After visiting India, Xi received a lavish welcome from US President Donald Trump in Washington. Trump’s G2 idea of a US-China entente seemingly diminished India’s strategic importance to Washington. Beijing also secured Trump’s acquiescence to freezing a $14-billion arms package for Taiwan. The PLA turns 100 in 2027. Since occupying the Shaksgam Valley in 1963, Beijing has consolidated its position near Siachen and linked it to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), spending $1 billion. CPEC passes through Gilgit-Baltistan, which India claims as part of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. In October, the Pakistani and Chinese armies reportedly began the Karakoram exercises after signing a Joint Border Military Commission agreement. This has reinforced the perception that India may face a single China-Pakistan front rather than two separate fronts, changing the nature of a possible multi-pronged conflict.
On the eastern frontier, Arunachal Pradesh has faced alleged PLA incursions. ITBP Director General Shatrujit Kapur recently said face-offs had continued since July. His remarks at an ITBP function in Rajasthan were ostensibly aimed at securing advanced drones for the force’s new Shaurya regiment. A report in The Hindu said Chinese forces had moved 6-7 km into Indian territory and occupied grazing areas used by local tribes. The MEA acknowledged face-offs in Upper Subansiri, saying they were being addressed diplomatically and militarily.
China is also reportedly building an 11,200-MW mega dam on the Yarlung Tsangpo, the upper Brahmaputra, in the Siang region, near its entry into India where it joins the Dibang and Lohit. India is pursuing the 1,605-MW Subansiri Upper Hydroelectric Project, or Menga Dam. Observers warn that the lack of a clear response could invite a Galwan-like eastern crisis.
In Ladakh, meanwhile, the Leh Apex Body and Kargil Democratic Alliance, along with civil society groups, are demanding greater autonomy, a legislature and constitutional safeguards under Article 371, which they say were promised by the Centre during talks on May 22.
Against this backdrop, US Secretary of State and National Security Adviser Marco Rubio’s October 20-22 business-focused visit was seen as another snub to Delhi. He bypassed the capital for Mumbai, where External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar joined him for talks on energy, trade, investment and defence, as well as events marking America’s 250th anniversary. The UAE Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister joined them for discussions on I2U2 and the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), initiatives involving India, the UAE, Israel and the US.
Rubio was also seeking fuel supplies amid concerns over Iran’s blockade of the Strait of Hormuz and Houthi threats to Bab el-Mandeb shipping. In Jamnagar, Rubio met Mukesh Ambani and his family at the industrialist’s refinery. Details were not disclosed. He may have urged the group to expedite its proposed $300-billion Texas refinery.
Washington also wants to fast-track a US-India trade agreement. US demands for market access could provoke India’s farm and manufacturing sectors. India’s services sector faces sharply higher H-1B visa fees; JD Vance’s description of Indian IT workers as “indentured servants” drew no official response.
Trump’s temporary waiver of sanctions provisions relating to Russian and Iranian oil purchases, alongside his reported plans to buy 300 million tonnes of diesel from Russia, must also be viewed in this wider context.
India’s strategic autonomy is under strain as Washington appears to accommodate Pakistan. Islamabad is meanwhile building Islamic partnerships: the Mecca Agreement with Saudi Arabia and Turkey has reportedly expanded into the Badr Agreement, involving Indonesia and Qatar, with Bangladesh showing interest. India’s ambition, often voiced by foreign-policy experts, to become the pole star of the Global South through multipolarity and multi-alignment may therefore have to wait.
Domestic challenges compound the external ones: inflation, unemployment, declining savings and a farm crisis, alongside paper-leak scandals, alleged Ayodhya temple embezzlement and concerns over voters’ rights and ECI manipulation. A government increasingly on the defensive struggles to anchor India’s external relations. The nation is indeed facing its hardest-ever test conflating both external and domestic crises into a serious challenge for India’s democracy.
The writer is a former Ambassador.
