Ranajoy Sen
When Prime Minister Narendra Modi returned from his latest visit to the United States, kudos awaited him in India. He appeared to have taken a litany of agreements and relations between India and the US a step forward.
Modi obtained a nod from the Obama administration and elected representatives at Capitol Hill to India’s enlistment in the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG).
By now, almost all NSG members are receptive to India’s membership in that organisation; the only noteworthy hurdle is China.
India’s relationship with China has been more adversarial than amicable. For the past few decades, relations between India and China have traversed largely on a China-initiated collective pattern of explicit courtesies and implicit hostility.
Since Modi’s election as PM, the Chinese have been quick to contemplate that the new administration would probably be less mealy-mouthed and hesitant in its dealings with China than some other previous dispensations.
The BJP is known for visions of an influential and powerful India; substantially similar to what the rulers of China covet for their own country. Additionally, Modi agreed to engage the Chinese, if it brought benefits to India. State level visits followed: Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi visited India; he was followed by Chinese President Xi Jinping, who displayed a friendly face to India and expressed hopes for an increasingly symbiotic relationship between the two countries.
A slew of agreements on economic activities followed and Modi, too, visited China. Steps were initiated to increase Chinese investment in India to tide over a trade deficit of $37.8 billion.
As a pointer to some tangible movement on the economic sphere, bilateral trade has increased from $3 billion in 2000 to about $66 billion at present.
However, in terms of security and national interests, China still seems intent on putting a spoke in India’s wheel. While it speaks of NPT and nuclear responsibility, it has no qualms assisting Pakistan in obtaining nuclear fuel capabilities and modernising that country’s nuclear arsenal. Despite unscrupulousness, when the issue came up in an earlier meeting of the NSG, China insisted that it did not violate the principles of the group.
In brazen insensitivity towards Indian concerns, China was the only country to thwart resolution 1267 of the United Nations (UN) Sanctions Committee, which was moved by India to officially list Masood Azhar, his Pakistan-based anti-India terrorist organisation, and its charity front, as abetting terrorism. It said enough proof was yet to be furnished by India to designate Azhar’s activities as terrorism.
China’s steadfast adherence to Pakistan and its endeavour to keep India potentially preoccupied with security threats are manifestations of its motive of decelerating India’s rise as a continental and global player.
The silver lining for India is that it has acquired meaningful waivers from the NSG, which actuated the Indo-American civil nuclear deal in 2008, despite possessing atomic weapons and not signing the NPT.
Whatever the outcome of the NSG confabulations, India needs to hone its indigenous strengths and utilise its diplomatic capital optimally to be able to ward off challenges from adversaries more effectively.
The author analyses political, economic and foreign affairs.
