By Shivaji Sarkar
Two giants meet. Since 1962, in a first, a US President welcomes a country head at air base in person – a rare moment indeed for a short truce till January 2027 – about three months. Perhaps, the world should rejoice. But is it good news for the world’s poor, including India, with the largest number of people below the poverty line in absolute terms? When the leaders passed the press corps at one point at the Oval Office, Trump said, “We had a great meeting,” reports NBC News.
Trump said Xi was “an expert on stone, aside from many other things, and he loves good granite.” A great comment. Would Trump’s real estate firms make a beeline to China and would Beijing allow it? In diplomacy, impossibility itself is impossible. The US can extract a lot from China in concessions. The poorer countries need to be careful. They may have to foot the bill.It also means further compromise on multilateralism and the UN.
More bilateralism is a threat to weaker nations and welfarism. It may hurt the people of the US itself with sharper corporatisation, de tested by Americans. By holding a White House summit during the UN General Assembly (UNGA), both leaders created a symbolic “split-screen” that effectively sidelined the UN as the centre of global governance. A Trump-Xi rapprochement is viewed by analysts at the Institute of South Asian Studies, Singapore, not as a definitive disaster, but as a complex strategic test that has repeatedly fallen short of fears over a formal ‘G2’ alliance.
Indian strategists are long worried that a direct US-China deal would marginalise New Delhi. However, actual engagements, such as the May 2026 summit, proved relatively banal and limited in major economic resets. For New Delhi, the key concerns are the possible sidelining of the Quad, with stalled summits raising fears of a leadership vacuum; growing manufacturing competition, as any easing of US-China trade friction could affect investments seeking alternatives in India; and mounting bilateral US pressures, particularly steep US tariffs on Indian exports that add to economic friction.
If Washington eases pressure on Beijing, India could face greater scrutiny over tariffs and market access. Agriculture, retail and technology could become particular areas of US pressure, especially as Washington seeks wider access to the Indian market. The Quad could lose strategic weight. A major US-China rapprochement, particularly on maritime security or wider geopolitical issues, could reduce Washington’s strategic focus on the Indo-Pacific.
For India, any dilution of US engagement would have implications for its regional balancing vis-à-vis China. If the US and China de-escalate their economic and trade tensions, global trade could become more stable, with steadier commodity prices and stronger demand, but the easing could also slow the relocation of global supply chains to India and leave New Delhi more exposed to targeted US trade pressure.
Weaker global growth and disruptions in China-linked supplies of critical minerals and semiconductors could create fresh vulnerabilities. A major pressure point is Russian oil. A new US sanctions law gives Washington the power to impose tariffs of up to 100% on countries buying significant quantities of Russian crude.
India’s continued energy trade with Moscow, therefore, remains a potential source of friction. US and Indian officials have already discussed the implications of the new measures.
Around 55% of India’s merchandise exports to the US face a baseline 10% Section 301 duty, with labour-intensive and machinery sectors particularly exposed. The US absorbs over 32% of India’s textile exports. Dominated by MSMEs with thin margins, the sector could lose competitiveness against Bangladesh and Vietnam if tariffs rise.
Re-strategisation would be required if India pines to be a global player as well as stabilise its economy for a too-stretched target of 2047.