By Ansuman Das & Pranaya Kumar Swain
For decades, nuclear energy sat uneasily at the margins of the climate debate: valued for its low emissions, distrusted for its cost and history of accidents. That is changing, as demand rises and countries race to decarbonise power systems, pulling nuclear back to the centre of the conversation, not as a relic of Cold War science, but as a tool for a warming planet.
Nuclear power supplies roughly a tenth of global electricity, and remains the world’s second-largest source of low-carbon electricity after hydropower. More than 400 reactors operate across 31 countries, with fresh construction concentrated in Asia. Its value lies in generating large volumes of low-emission electricity independently of weather, increasingly useful as grids lean more on variable renewables. France draws most of its power from reactors; Slovakia, Hungary and Ukraine also lean heavily on nuclear. Japan, meanwhile, has been restarting reactors after its post-Fukushima shutdown, proving a major accident need not eliminate nuclear from a mix.
India’s story is more distinctive. Nuclear contributes only about 3.1% of India’s electricity, from an installed capacity of 8.78 GW, against a government target of 100 GW by 2047, a huge acceleration shaped by decades of technology restrictions following India’s nuclear tests and its position outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which pushed the country toward self-reliance and its three-stage programme, including exploiting its thorium reserves.
The 2008 India-US civil nuclear deal reopened access to global commerce, but India’s liability regime continued to unsettle suppliers. That is the context for the SHANTI Act, 2025, which restructures India’s nuclear laws: permitting private participation in select activities under licensing, while keeping enrichment, spent-fuel management and heavy-water production under central control, and replacing the single liability cap with a graded framework.
Alongside it, the Nuclear Energy Mission allocates 20,000 crore for small modular reactors, with at least five indigenous units targeted by 2033.
Technology and finance are only part of the challenge; nuclear power depends on public trust. Chernobyl and Fukushima keep radiation risk vivid in public memory. India’s programme has emphasised safety assessments and post-Fukushima upgrades, but reassurance must be built through independent, transparent institutions and timely disclosure. Scaling to 100 GW will demand a far larger ecosystem of regulators and skilled workers, and a shortage of nuclear talent is already a concern.
The climate case for nuclear is straightforward but shouldn’t be overstated: it is low-carbon, energy-dense and capable of round-the-clock generation, valuable because solar and wind output varies with weather. That makes it a complement to renewables, not a substitute. Its economics are harder, with long build times and common cost overruns, so the real question is whether a diversified system including it can deliver reliability and deep decarbonisation at acceptable cost.
India needs enormous additional electricity as incomes rise and industry, transport and buildings electrify, even as it pursues net-zero by 2070. As of July 2026, India had crossed 300 GW of installed non-fossil capacity, of which nuclear supplies just 8.78 GW, so the 100-GW target is best read as an addition to that build-out, not a retreat.
Financing, manpower, waste management, liability and public confidence remain formidable obstacles. India’s approach is especially consequential because it combines rapid expansion, self-reliance and a controlled opening to private capital, rarely pursued together at this scale.
If it can build faster without compromising safety, and sustain public trust through genuine transparency, it could show that nuclear has a real role in a large developing economy’s energy transition. If it fails, the reasons will likely be familiar: cost overruns, delays and weak public confidence.
Either way, nuclear no longer needs to ask whether it belongs in the climate conversation, the question now is how much of it gets built, how quickly, and how safely.
Ansuman Das is a Department of Atomic Energy Fellow, Pranaya Kumar Swain is Professor, School of Humanities and Social Sciences at National Institute of Science Education and Research (NISER), Bhubaneswar.
