The Director General of Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) Shatrujeet Kapur’s remark on 22 October that Indian and Chinese forces are locked in multiple standoffs along the LAC in Arunachal Pradesh since July is deeply concerning for India.
It is the first time an Indian government official has, on-record highlighted, the face-offs between the two forces in the region.
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“In the past few-days, a situation arose where face-off happened at several locations in Arunachal and it still continues,” Kapur said at an event in Alwar, Rajasthan. This happening, despite a string of diplomatic and military engagements between both sides, appears to give an impression that ties between the neighbours are nowhere near normal.
All the political posturing, no matter the claims, seem to have failed. Besides, the ITBP chief’s assertion that India is no match for China in conventional warfare, though not surprising, should set off alarm bells. Flagging that the ITBP’s weapons are about 50 years old and are badly in need for modernisation, Kapur argued that conventional methods alone may not be enough to take on China, which has invested heavily in upgrading its arms and infrastructure.
Giving the examples of Ukraine and Iran’s fightbacks against their bigger adversaries, he stressed the need for drone and counter-drone capability. It took the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) more than 24 hours to acknowledge, though in an indirect manner, what the ITBP chief remarked. That in itself showed how the Central Gov’t is unaware of ground realities at the borders.
The situation in India-China border areas “gets disturbed” when Chinese forces diverge from established patrolling patterns, MEA spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal told at a regular press briefing. While there isn’t any official statement from the Ministry of Defence on this matter till now, the Opposition Congress has slammed the government over the “deafening silence from the prime minister and his establishment” on the face-offs.
India and China have taken several steps since October 2024 to stabilise relations, which plunged to their lowest point in decades after the deadly Galwan Valley clashes in eastern Ladakh in 2020 during the peak of the COVID-19 pandemic.
An agreement on disengagement at the remaining friction points along the LAC paved the way for Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia, in October 2024.
Subsequent high-level engagements, including Modi’s visit to China for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in August 2025 and Xi’s recent visit to New Delhi for the BRICS summit, appeared to signal a mutual interest in repairing ties.
That the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops were engaged in face-offs with the Indian Army while New Delhi was rolling out a red carpet for the Chinese President in September indicates how intricate the task is for India to normalise ties with its northern neighbour.
At the same time, China’s refusal to recognise Arunachal Pradesh as Indian territory, its periodic publication of maps assigning Chinese names to locations in the state, and its objections to India’s own naming initiatives in Ladakh highlight the continuing territorial contention.
Given China’s economic superiority over India, with New Delhi’s trade deficit with Beijing reaching an all-time high of $112.2 billion in financial year 2025–26, normalising ties appears to be in India’s interest.
India imports large quantities of Chinese electronics, machinery, industrial components, chemicals and pharmaceutical ingredients which support Indian manufacturing. The continued expansion of the trade deficit makes reducing critical supply-chain vulnerabilities an important economic and national-security priority for India.
Seen in the context of the continuing military tensions in Arunachal Pradesh, the situation has led an already weak India into a strategic dilemma. While India may be seeking to counter China’s territorial pressure,it continues to remain heavily dependent on the latter economically.
Finding a way out of this deadlock appears to be a rather difficult proposition for India given the way the country’s foreign policy has drifted over the last decade.
