By Piotr Opali ski
Relations between Pakistan and Taliban-ruled Afghanistan are currently among the most unstable elements of South Asia’s security architecture. Increasing border incidents, escalating political tensions, and growing activity of extremist groups indicate that the Islamabad-Kabul conflict has transcended the framework of incidental crises and taken on the character of a chronic regional threat. The beginning of 2026 confirmed this trend, bringing further militarisation of the border, continued trade blockades, and a deepening diplomatic impasse.
The consequences of the crisis extend beyond bilateral relations, affecting the interests of China, Iran, Russia, India, and Central Asian states, as well as the security of regional trade routes. Its axis is defined by the Durand Line – the border drawn in the 19th century between Afghanistan and British India, and since 1947, Pakistan. It divides ethnically Pashtun lands and has never been formally recognised by Afghan governments, thus failing to serve a stabilising function. It has become a permanent arena of political, military, and narrative rivalry, where state, tribal, and ideological interests intersect, as well as Islamabad’s strategic aspirations and the Taliban’s need to consolidate power.
Islamabad treats securing the border not only as an element of protecting internal security but also as an instrument for managing escalation with Kabul, particularly in the context of the growing activity of the Pakistani Taliban movement (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan – TTP). In turn, the Afghan Taliban are using the dispute with Pakistan to strengthen their internal legitimacy and social mobilisation, although their ability to effectively control the border remains limited by the fragmentation of the power apparatus and the autonomy of local tribal structures.
Armed clashes regularly occur along the border, particularly in Chaman, Spin Boldak, Kurram, and Angoor Adda regions. Tensions stem from three overlapping factors: Kabul’s questioning of the border’s legitimacy, tightening of Pakistani control, and use of these areas by the TTP as an operational base.
The border has also become an arena for narrative rivalry. Kabul portrays Pakistan’s actions as an attempt to impose a colonial order, while Islamabad interprets the Taliban’s stance as indirectly tolerating terrorist threats. The escalation was deepened by Pakistani airstrikes in Paktika and Khost provinces after the Peshawar attack in November 2025, as well as subsequent ground and air operations in Afghanistan, resulting in losses among TTP fighters, civilian casualties, and the temporary closure of border crossings.
In 2024–2025, the crisis also encompassed economic and demographic dimensions. Pakistan introduced restrictive visa regulations, transit restrictions, and mass deportations of Afghans without valid identity documents – over 1.5 million people. For Islamabad, this was part of a strategy of conditionality and deterrence, justified by security concerns and the activities of the TTP (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan). Beginning 2026, the pressure continued, and the prolonged closure of the main border crossings – Torkham and Spin Boldak – paralyzed legal trade.
The most persistent source of the crisis remains the activity of the TTP and Kabul’s limited ability to neutralise it. The TTP operates in a decentralised, tribal environment, often beyond the real reach of the state apparatus. Between 2023 and 2025, the group evolved from a loose coalition into a more coordinated cross-border network, focusing on military targets and testing Pakistan’s deterrence capabilities.
In December 2025, TTP leadership council, the Rahbari Shura, approved a new administrative and operational structure for 2026. This includes, among other things: establishment of two new management zones, so-called shadow provinces – the Western Zone (Balochistan) and the Central Zone, each with its own military commander-in-chief. New units were also brought under TTP control, including the Kashmir province, and Gilgit was divided.
Four scenarios are possible in the next two years. One, continuation of controlled escalation – maintaining pressure at the border, deportations, limited goods and passenger transit; Two, multilateral mediation – temporary freezing of escalation with the support of Qatar, Turkey, China, Russia, and selective involvement of the US; implementation of monitoring and crisis communication mechanisms; Three, technical de-escalation – limiting TTP activity through operational and intelligence actions, without full normalization of bilateral relations; and four, regionalization of the crisis – involvement of external actors, further fragmentation of trade routes, and deepening of cross-border instability.
Indeed, the Pakistani-Afghan confrontation is structural and long-term. The lack of credible dialogue formats and effective escalation control mechanisms means that the Pakistani-Afghan border remains one of the most unstable areas in South and Central Asia. Any international mediation will be hampered by asymmetrical expectations and limited capacity to enforce agreements. The risks are systemic and extend beyond the regional dimension, indirectly affecting the security of the wider Eurasian region.
The writer is expert, Centre for International Relations, Poland
