Vappala Balachandran
Can the recent elections in Israel and US midterms initiate a movement towards peace in West Asia, where thousands of innocent lives were lost in Gaza, Lebanon, Yemen and Iran wars? This is difficult to say. Anti-war demonstrations, statements, opinion polls and public rallies have not yet resolved the conflicting picture. A November poll by the American Alliance for Middle East Peace’s (ALLMEP) public-opinion research initiative, as reported on November 12 by “Business Insider” found that 50% of those interviewed had felt that their candidates’ positions on Israel-Palestine were a decisive factor in their congressional vote. That figure rose to 63% from among voters under 35.
On Gaza, 78% wanted America to put pressure on Israel to allow humanitarian aid and reconstruction materials to flow in. On a separate question about West Bank, 78% also wanted Washington to pressure — even through penalties or sanctions — to deter the Israeli government’s actions, including its handling of “settler violence” against Palestinians. As against this, “The Jerusalem Post” (October 22) lamented (before the Israel elections), that the overwhelming idea of the “Song of Peace” as demanded by massive crowds of Israelis after the 1995 assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, “that was once at the heart of the political debate in Israel – is strikingly absent this time around.” It said that “few candidates are offering a vision for relations with the Palestinians, let alone a path toward resolving the conflict.” What is the reason? Professor Gideon Rahat of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem analysed this phenomenon in recent interviews: Primarily, the relationship with the Palestinians is not the central focus of most Israelis after four years of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s rule.
During these years, he had “fundamentally transformed Israel’s political landscape by legitimising previously marginal ultra nationalist forces.” Rahat added that the normalisation of “the far right represents an enduring challenge that may survive Ne tanyahu’s eventual departure.” Israelis are now more worried about the fundamental change in the character of the Jewish State and its security. Most of the opposition parties seeking Netanyahu’s ouster are a mix of centre-right and right-wing parties. “Only one Jew ish party in the bloc, the Democrats, appears open to addressing the Palestinian issue.” The Hamas attack of 7 October 2023 also alienated some of those who had been sympathetic among the Jewish population. Another reason, according to Rahat, is the weakening of judicial independence, which has eroded “institutional safeguards.” As he put it: “A court cannot sustain democracy by itself.” In his view, democratic reconstruction requires “stronger political parties, institutional reforms, and a broader distribution of political authority.”
He hints that this is difficult with 33 political parties present during the 2026 elections, 22 of which did not get any seats. One of the major reasons for the present Palestinian problem is the disinterest — bordering on animosity — shown by its rich and powerful Arab neighbours. The rationale for this was analysed by former US Ambassador Ryan Crocker in an interview with Politico on 21 February 2024, after the Hamas war in Gaza started. Crocker, whom President George W. Bush called “America’s Lawrence of Arabia,” was US Ambassador to Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Kuwait, and later to Afghanistan and Pakistan. According to Crocker, the emergence of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) in 1967 was a “watershed” moment for the Palestinian resistance, which, from 1947-48, had been led by neighbouring Arab countries against Israel. Arafat’s description of the PLO as the “sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people” annoyed his Arab neighbours. Also, the 1969 Cairo Agreement gave the PLO under Arafat almost full autonomy over the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, and the right to launch operations from South Lebanon. This was a major reason for the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Even earlier, the PLO’s turn to armed struggle had caused much concern among its Arab neighbours. Crocker cites two incidents in 1970 and 1971.
In 1970, King Hussein of Jordan expelled the PLO during the “Black September” operation, using Gen. Zia-ul Haq — then a Pakistani brigadier working as his adviser — when the King detected a conspiracy to overthrow him. In 1971, Jordan’s Prime Minister Wasfi Tell was killed by the PFLP faction of the PLO as he entered the lobby of Cairo’s Sheraton Hotel. Crocker says Egyptian hostility towards the PLO was such that years later, even in 2024, “Egypt just exploded when [U.S. Secretary of State] Tony Blinken proposed they give temporary sanctuary to Gazans.” Their apprehension was also shaped to some extent by the perceived closeness between the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas in Gaza. Another reason was Arafat’s initiative to forge links with Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s Iran. As I had mentioned in a piece in The Citizen (7 May 2024), the first foreign leader to visit Islamic Iran was Yasser Arafat on February 17, 1979.
Contemporary historians also said that the creation of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which is now a formidable force in that region, was a result of Arafat’s suggestions through Lebanese PLO leader Anis Naccache, who had led the 1975 Vienna kidnapping of OPEC oil ministers through Carlos the Jackal. Naccache worked closely with Jalaleddin Farsi, who was then close to Khomeini, to prevent a coup against the latter in the unsettled conditions in Iran. Crocker also mentions the hidden antipathy of Syrian leader Hafez al-Assad towards Arafat’s PLO despite apparent bonhomie.
Assad distrusted Arafat for acting without consulting Damascus, especially on ceasefires and talks with Jordan and America. Hafez tried to weaken him by supporting other extremist factions in the PLO. Jerusalem Post (20 September) reported that only 17% of Israelis and 21% of Palestinians surveyed in West Bank and East Jerusalem (Gaza was not included) believe that Israel and an independent Palestinian State can coexist peacefully, according to a Pew Research Center report published this September. Tel Aviv University’s Peace Index, which has tracked Israeli attitudes toward peace with the Palestinians since the September 1993 Oslo Accords, shows support for negotiations peaking at around 80% in 2009 under Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, before falling sharply to about 30% in 2024 after the 7 October 2023 Hamas attack.
Under these circumstances, the region can only hope that the 20-point Gaza Peace Plan of 2025, endorsed by the United Nations Security Council, would bring peace to the region — though so far, the plan has yet to deliver results.
The writer is a former Special Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat.
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