By Shivaji Sarkar
Rapid developments appear to be reshaping India’s regional landscape, hinting at a subtle yet significant realignment of strategic interests. These shifts could mark the early stages of a new regional balance — one that may open fresh avenues for India and alter long-standing equations across Indo-Pacific, West and South Asia.
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The US decision to relax sanctions on Iran’s Chabahar port for six months has revived India’s long-stalled $370 million project, strengthening its role in regional logistics and security. Combined with a new 10-year defence pact with Washington, these moves point to a quiet reconfiguration of the Indo-Pacific and West and South Asian order on the sidelines of the ASEAN defence ministers’ meeting.
Together, these moves signal a recalibration of Washington’s South Asia policy — one that appears to recognise India’s pivotal role and extends cooperation well beyond trade or tariff disputes.
The significance of these developments cannot be overstated. The Chabahar relaxation comes at a time when the US–Taliban standoff over Bagram airbase remains unresolved and the global energy market is under stress from continuing instability in the Middle East. If these changes continue on their current trajectory, they could have lasting implications for the global strategic order — especially given the overlapping signals from Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump’s Alaska dialogue, the Xi–Trump trade understanding on tariffs and rare-earth supplies, and the quiet thaw between India and China on limited trade and security matters.
During the ASEAN meeting, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh remarked that India “no longer remains China-focused,” suggesting a broader approach to regional security. His statement came after talks with US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth, where both sides reaffirmed a shared vision of peace, prosperity, and stability in the Indo-Pacific.
The Chabahar Port project lies at the heart of this emerging realignment. For Washington, it provides a controlled avenue to support Afghanistan’s reconstruction without strengthening Pakistan’s leverage. For New Delhi, it is a crucial instrument to counter Chinese and Pakistani influence in the region. Strategically located almost opposite Pakistan’s Chinese-built Gwadar Port, Chabahar offers India a rare geopolitical advantage.
The port’s inclusion in the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) further boosts its relevance. It links India not only to Iran but also to Russia, Central Asia, and Europe via sea, rail, and road networks. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, both landlocked, have expressed interest in using Chabahar as their gateway to the Indian Ocean Region, reinforcing India’s status as a logistics hub for Eurasian trade.
The Chabahar project, rooted in the 2016 India-Iran-Afghanistan Trilateral Agreement, gives India a vital overland route to Afghanistan — symbolising strategic autonomy from China and Pakistan’s regional hold.
The US had previously revoked the Chabahar waiver in September 2025, exposing Indian entities like India Ports Global Limited (IPGL) to potential sanctions under the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act (IFCA). The renewed relaxation, therefore, is both symbolic and strategic — an exception carved out for India amid an otherwise hostile US policy toward Tehran.
Notably, Chabahar remains the only Iranian entity explicitly exempted from US sanctions — an indicator of its unique place in American strategic calculations. Although not directly tied to Chabahar, the 10-year India–US Defence Pact represents a deeper phase of cooperation.
The framework builds on the Security of Supply Arrangement signed in 2024, which allows both countries to request priority delivery of defence materials from private suppliers in each other’s markets.
In 2024, India–US trade stood at $118.2 billion, with India enjoying a $36.8 billion surplus — exporting $77.5 billion and importing $40.7 billion. However, the relationship remains textured: President Trump’s imposition of 24% reciprocal tariffs on Indian goods, followed by a 25% penalty over New Delhi’s Russian oil and defence purchases, reflects the persistent friction within an otherwise expanding partnership.
Analysts see these moves as part of a broader US recalibration in West and South Asia, where the search for reliable partners has grown urgent. The six-month sanction pause on Chabahar may not amount to a full policy reversal toward Iran, but it clearly indicates that Washington is ready to make selective exceptions for India when strategic imperatives demand flexibility.
In the long run, this could mark the beginning of a more pragmatic US regional strategy — one that looks beyond its traditional alliances with Israel and Pakistan and acknowledges the complexity of a multipolar Asia. For India, the developments reaffirm its growing ability to engage simultaneously with the US, Russia, Iran, and China, maintaining autonomy amid global rivalries.
For now, any US–Iran rapprochement remains distant. Relations between the two remain at their lowest point in decades, clouded by deep mistrust, nuclear tensions, and the June 2025 military confrontations. Yet, both sides share overlapping interests — from ensuring Iran’s stability to combating extremist networks — that could, over time, provide a basis for limited cooperation.
