The framers of the Constitution envisaged the office of the Governor as a neutral constitutional authority, detached from partisan politics and committed to preserving the balance of India’s federal structure. The Governor was never meant to function as an agent of the Union government or as a political overseer of elected state governments. Yet, over the decades, and especially in recent years, the office has increasingly been transformed into an instrument of political control wielded by the ruling party at the Centre. In a systematic and coordinated manner, Governors have been deployed to obstruct, delay, and politically undermine Opposition-ruled states. The office has become deeply subservient to the Union government, functioning less as a constitutional safeguard and more as an extension of the Centre’s political machinery.
One of the most sensitive responsibilities entrusted to the Governors is deciding which party or leader to invite to form the government after an unclear electoral verdict. Over time, constitutional conventions evolved around this power, with the widely accepted norm being that the single largest party or a pre-poll alliance commanding the largest mandate should ordinarily receive the first opportunity to prove its majority on the floor of the Assembly. Yet, in recent years, this convention has increasingly been bent, selectively interpreted, or outright ignored.
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The recent Tamil Nadu elections serve as the latest example. The results to the elections were declared 4 May. Yet, there was no invitation from Governor Rajendra Vishwanath Arlekar to C Joseph Vijay, whose party, TVK, emerged as the single largest party in the polls, to form the government. In fact, since that day, Vijay has met the Governor every single day to stake a claim for government formation. But only after five days, 9 May, the Governor finally invited Vijay to form the government. This gave the impression that the AIADMK combine that included the BJP failed to muster or manipulate enough MLAs to stake a claim.
Such episodes have happened in the past as well. After the 2018 Karnataka Assembly election, the BJP emerged as the single largest party with 104 seats, but short of the majority mark, while the Congress and the Janata Dal (Secular), which had secured a post-poll alliance with a clear majority, staked claim together. Then Governor Vajubhai Vala nevertheless invited BJP leader BS Yediyurappa to form the government and granted him time to prove his majority, despite the Opposition alliance already presenting evidence of numerical strength. To stress, that was a post poll alliance. Eventually, the Supreme Court had to intervene and order an expedited floor test, leading to Yediy urappa’s resignation before the vote.
The Maharashtra political crisis of 2019 provided an even more striking example. The BJP and Shiv Sena contested the election as allies, but their alliance collapsed after the results. Subsequently, the Shiv Sena, NCP, and Congress announced a post-poll coalition with majority support. However, in a controversial pre-dawn development, then Governor Bhagat Singh Koshyari managed to get BJP’s Devendra Fadnavis sworn in as Chief Minister with NCP leader Ajit Pawar as Deputy Chief Minister, despite questions surrounding the legitimacy of the claimed support. Nevertheless, the government collapsed within days after the Supreme Court ordered an immediate floor test.
There have also been instances where the norm of inviting the single largest party itself was disregarded. For instance, in Goa and Manipur in 2017, the Congress emerged as the single largest party, but the governors invited the BJP to form the government after it swiftly stitched together post-poll alliances.
In contrast, after the 2013 Delhi Assembly elections, then Lt Governor Najeeb Jung had invited the BJP to form the government as it was the largest party. However, the BJP declined to form the government as it fell short of a majority, following which Jung invited the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP), the second largest party, to form the government.
Governors are appointed by the Union government and remain in office at its pleasure. Since they enjoy immunity under Article 361 for actions undertaken while in office, there exists little direct accountability. This combination of political dependence and constitutional protection has allowed the office of the Governor to become vulnerable to misuse.
The deeper problem lies in the failure of successive governments to reform the office itself. India’s federal democracy depends on constitutional conventions being applied fairly and consistently. When Governors abandon neutrality and function in ways that appear politically aligned with the Centre, they weaken the credibility of both the office and the federal structure itself.
