By Janusz Bylinski
Since December last, Somaliland has been at the centre of a cyclone that has gripped the Middle East and Horn of Africa. Israel’s recognition of its sovereignty sent ripples from Turkey across Africa. Was this a catalyst for the crystallisation of a new balance of power, or was it part of a planned regional reorganisation?
On 26 December, Israel formally recognised Somaliland as a sovereign and independent state, arguing it meets “the objective criteria for statehood under customary international law, as reflected in the Montevideo Convention.” As per the 1933 Convention, a state must possess the following characteristics: a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and the capacity to enter relations with other states.
In return, Somaliland declared it would join the Abraham Accords. In early January, Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sar visited Somaliland, and the official signing of the accession agreement was expected during the visit of the country’s prime minister to Israel in March this year, which will probably be postponed due to the ongoing war with Iran.
The recognition is not an ad hoc decision, taken in isolation from broader plans. It coincides with the new president striving to improve the country’s international standing, and, on the other hand, with plans being developed in Israel to rebuild the regional security architecture.
Somaliland is a quasi-state with a functioning democratic system, government, military, and currency. Since its proclamation of independence in 1991, it has operated in a political grey zone, unrecognised but also undisturbed by its neighbours, including Somalia, which formally considers it part of a federation.
Somalia itself is close to failed state status, threatened by further disintegration. Despite its lack of international recognition, it maintains representations in several countries on a reciprocal basis, such as diplomatic relations with Taiwan and cooperation agreements with China.
It is the world’s fourth poorest country. Livestock exports (sheep, cows, and camels), primarily to Saudi Arabia, account for the majority of its GDP. Its only remaining military base, near the port of Berbera, has been owned by the UAE since 2017 and the naval base has been transformed into a nearly complete facility, equipped with advanced infrastructure, including a modern military port, a deep-water dock, and a runway with hangars and support facilities.
Of all European countries, Great Britain is most involved in economic development in its former colony. For the UAE, Berbera is both a link in an extensive network of ports and airports stretching across Africa, and a strategic outpost whose control creates power projection and allows it to influence the vital geopolitical environment.
The synergy between Israel and the UAE, which has been strengthening in recent years, means their interests in Somaliland are largely aligned. For both, control of the crucial chokepoint between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean is a stake worth playing for. Identifying and blocking threats from Iran, being able to influence maritime transport, building new logistics routes that bypass or diminish the importance of existing ones, offering transhipment and maintenance services to ship-owners, and taking over the transport channels for critical raw materials all represent significant gains in themselves.
Acquiring Somaliland as a client and protégé is part of a broader strategy to reshape the balance of power in the Middle East to Israel’s advantage.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu recently announced a plan for a “hexagon of alliances” that would encompass Israel, Greece, Cyprus, India, and unnamed countries in the Middle East, Asia, and Africa. This hexagon would encompass a security zone on Israel’s periphery and be capable of countering two axes: a Shiite axis led by Iran and a Sunni axis of states supporting radical Islam.
Modi’s visit to Israel, two days before the launch of the attack on Iran, confirms the increasingly strong India-Israel ties and synergies of interests.
India is the largest recipient of Israeli defence products. It shares with Israel the threat of Muslim extremism and terrorism. Both countries are vitally interested in maritime security, with India seeking to play an increasingly important role in its security architecture and build alternatives to China’s BRI connecting the Indian Ocean with the Mediterranean.
However, the new balance of power in the Middle East following the war with Iran will be crucial. It’s impossible to predict whether the Arab states of the Peninsula will reassess their security situation and seek alternative sources of weapons and alliances. Whether they will close ranks to oppose Israel’s absolute hegemony, or whether their rivalry will deepen. And whether a victorious Israel will unimpededly pursue its future plans.
